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F. A. Hayek on Constructivism and Ethics 
by Arthur M. Diamond, Jr. 
Department of Economics, The University of Chicago 
Long before receiving his Nobel Prize, Friedrich von Hayek was well re- 
spected in the academic community. John Maynard Keynes had glowing 
praise for Hayek's 1944 The Road to Serfdom.' Milton Friedman and Paul 
Samuelson, antagonists on many issues, agree that Hayek's 1945 "The Use 
of Knowledge in Society"' was a major contribution to political-economic 
thought. These early works by Hayek led a writer for the Nation to express 
what must have been the view of a great many, that "because [Hayek] is 
among the most thoughtful and consistent supporters of a market 
economy. . . , those who disagree with him cannot ignore him."' 
Hayek's early reputation as one of the premier defenders of the free 
market has remained intact through more than thirty years of further writ- 
ing on political philosophy. If the praise given the early works was a critical 
response to thoughtfulness and consistency, that given the later works was 
an uncritical response to past reputation. The main object here will be to 
argue that after The Rood to Serfdom and "The Use of Knowledge in 
Society" Hayek's writings in political philosophy contain fundamental un- 
resolved problems. First is the inconsistency between many of Hayek's posi- 
tions in ethics. In particular Hayek endorses four ethical positions that 
cannot all be reconciled: relativism, Institutional Social Darwinism, utili- 
tarianism, and contractarianism. Apart from their mutual inconsistency, at 
least one, and perhaps as many as three, of the positions are also incon- 
sistent with Hayek's condemnation of the broad philosophical approach he 
identifies as "constructivism." Secondly, the distinction between wnstruc- 
tivist rationalism and critical rationalism, upon which Hayek bases his 
evaluation of ethical positions, rests on the assumption that particular posi- 
tions in epistemology, ethics and politics are closely linked. Yet Hayek's 
own examples refute that assumption. The final problem with Hayek's 
political thought is that each of his four ethical positions is independently 
open to attack. This final problem will not he emphasized since the standard 
objections to the four positions are well known. 
Constructivism 
The distinction between constructivist rationalism, which Hayek condemns, 
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and critical rationalism, which he endorses, recurs frequently in Hayek's 
later writings. As Hayek uses the term, "constructivism" refers to particular 
positions on each of three distinct levels of discourse: epistemology, ethics 
and politics. Hayek apparently believes that the views on the respective 
levels are somehow connected, but he never makes clear the exact nature of 
that connection. It might be that he wants to claim that the views on one 
level follow almost as certainly as logical implications from those'on 
another, but he does not say this explicitly. What he does say is that par- 
ticular views on one level make views on another level "almost inevitable."' 
If in fact the positions on each level do go together in the way that Hayek 
believes, then his concept of "constructivism" is a useful abstraction. If they 
do not go together, then the concept would be a poor one for two reasons. 
First, we would find that a significant number of important thinkers would 
have some, but not all, of the main characteristics of the concept. Thus the 
concept would be of very limited usefulness in classifying intellectual 
phenomena. Second, and more importantly, it would lead us to accept and 
reject positions for the wrong reason: namely that the positions are thought 
(incorrectly) to be tied to other positions. 
In this section the first task will be to isolate the views Hayek associates 
with constructivism on each level of discourse-i.e., in epistemology, ethics 
and practical politics. The second task will be to present and analyze a list 
drawn from Hayek of men in the constructivist and anti-constructivist 
groups. The purpose of the analysis will be to see how many of those whom 
Hayek identifies as constructivist did in fact hold constructivist views on all 
levels of discourse. If Hayek's constructivists frequently do not hold con- 
structivist views on all three levels, then Hayek's use of the distinction 
between constructivist and critical rationalism will have been shown 
unsound. Our sources consist mainly of five essays and the first two volumes 
of Law,Legislation and L i b e r t ~ . ~The first essay, "Individualism: True and 
Fal~e,"~was written prior to his adoption of the term "constructivism" 
when, instead of referring to two sorts of rationalism, he made the same dis- 
tinction in terms of "rationalists" and "anti-rationalists." The essays "Kinds 
of Rationalism"' and "The Errors of Constructivism"~ contain Hayek's 
most extended comments on constructivism. Finally, there are his essays 
"The Results of Human Action But Not of Human De~ign,"~ and "The 
Legal and Political Philosophy of David H~me . " ' ~  
In epistemology, Hayek sometimes identifies constructivism with an atti-
tude and sometimes with a particular method. The attitude is one of opti- 
mism with regard to the powers of human reason. Thus he says: "It is 
perhaps understandable that constructivist rationalists, in their pride in the 
great powers of human reason, should have revolted against the demand for 
submission to rules whose significance they do not fully understand, and 
which produce an order which we cannot predict in detail."" The opposite 
attitude, which Hayek himself endorses, views man "not as a highly rational 
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and intelligent but as a very irrational and fallible being.. . ."12 When Hayek 
identifies constructivism with a particular epistemological method, the one 
that he picks out is Cartesian geometric deduction. According to Hayek, 
constructivism conceives of reason as "a capacity of the mind t o  arrive at  
the truth by a deductive process from a few obvious and undoubtable 
premises."'' 
In  ethics, Hayek sees two constructivist positions: social contract theory 
and Benthamite utilitarianism. In  regard t o  the former he says: 
This "rationalist" approach.. .meant in effect a relapse into earlier, an- 
thropomorphic modes of thinking. It produced a renewed propensity to 
ascribe the origin of all institutions of culture to invention or design. 
Morals, religion and law, language and writing, money and market, 
were thought of as having been deliberately constructed by somebody, 
or at least as owing whatever perfection they possessed to such design. 
This intentionalist or pragmatic account of history found its fullest 
expression in the conception of the formation of society by a social con- 
tract, first in Hobbes and then in Rousseau, who in many respects was a 
direct follower of Descartes. Even though their theory was not always 
meant as an historical account of what actually happened, it was always 
meant to provide a guideline for deciding whether or not existing in- 
stitutions were to he approved as rational.14 
In regard t o  the second constructivist position in ethics, Hayek claims that, 
"the constructivist interpretation of rules of conduct is generally known as  
utilitarianism." Speaking more precisely, constructivism is only character- 
istic of "the strict utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham and his school" which 
"undertakes to judge the appropriateness of conduct by an explicit calcu- 
lation of the pleasure and pain that it will cause."'3 
Finally, on the level of practical politics, Hayek identifies constructivism 
with socialist central planning. He  claims that: 
Rationalism in this sense is the doctrine which assumes that all 
institutions which benefit humanity have in the past and ought in the 
future to be invented in clear awareness of the desirable effects that they 
produce; that they are to be approved and respected only to the extent 
that we can show that the varticular effects thev will oroduce in anv 
given situation are preferable to the effects another arrangement wouli 
~roduce: that we have it in our Dower so toshave our institutions that of 
a11 possible sets of results that which we prefer to all others will be 
realized; and that our reason should never resort to automatic or 
mechanical devices when conscious consideration of all factors would 
make preferable an outcome different from that of the spontaneous 
process. It is from this kind of social rationalism or constructivism that 
all modern socialism, planning and totalitarianism derives.16 
The preceding should suffice as a documented summary of the various 
positions that Hayek associates with constructivism. The next step is to list 
and analyze those men whom Hayek identifies as either constructivist 
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rationalists o r  critical rationalists. The  following table lists those explicitly 
mentioned by Hayek along with a citation t o  the source or sources of that 
reference. 
Men Identified as 
Constructivist Rationalists 
John Austin (S,' p. 88; 
N,t P. 15) 
Francis Bacon (S, p. 85) 
Beccaria (S, p. 85) 
Bentham (S, p. 88) 
G. B. Chisholm (N, pp. 6, 
16-17) 
Auguste Comte (LLL, 
3:173:
.
N.
.
D. 14), 
Descartes (I, pp. 9-10; 
S, pp. 84-86, 94; LLL, 
3:173; N, pp. 5-6) 
Hegel (S, p. 93) 
Helvetius (S, p. 88) 
Alexander Herzen 
(N, P. 16) 
Thomas Hobhes (S, pp. 
85, 93; LLL, 1:9-10; 
N, P. 15) 
L. T. Hobhouse (N, p. 6) 
Hans Kelsen (N, 
pp. 17-18) 
Karl Marx (S, p. 93; 
N, P. 5 )  
G. E. Moore (S, p. 88) 
Plato (S, p. 93) 
Hans Reichenbach 
(N, P. 16) 
Rousseau (S, p. 94; N, 
p. 6; LLL, 1:lO) 
Torgny T. Segerstedt 
N, P. 6)  
B. F. Skinner (N, p. 6)  
Voltaire (N, p. 5) 
Men Identified as 
Critical Rationalists 
Lord Acton (S, p. 94) 
St. Thomas Aquinas 
(S, P. 94) 
Aristotle (S, p. 94) 
Edmund Burke 
(I,$ P. 94) 
Adam Ferguson (I, p. 7; 
S, p. 99; N, p. 5; 
LLL,§ 1:20) 
W. E. Gladstone 
(S, P. 85) 
David Hume (S, pp. 84, 
87; LLL, I:20; N, 
PP. 5, 11) 
Bernard Mandeville (I, 
p. 9; S, PP. 84, 99; 
LLL, 1:ZO) 
Carl Menger (S, pp. 84, 
94, 99) 
Montesquieu (S, pp. 93-
94, 99) 
Karl R. Popper (N, 
p 11; S ,  p. 94) 
Adam Smith (I, p. 7; 
S, P. 99;N, P. 5) 
Alexis de Tocqueville 
6 ,  P. 94) 
Josiah Tucker (I, p. 7; 
s ,  P 99) 
Giambattista Vico 
(1, P. 9) 
1980 HAYEK ON CONSTRUCTIVISM AND ETHICS 357 
Men Identified as 
in the Middle 
Humboldt (S,p. 94) 
Immanuel Kant (S, p. 94) 
John Locke (S, pp. 84, 98, 
107; N,  p. 19) 
John Stuart Mill (I, p. 11) 
Herbert Spencer (I, p. 11) 
*"S"refers to Hayek, Studies in Philosophy. See note 7, infra. 
YN" refers to Hayek, New Studies. See note 8, infra. 
$"I" refers to Hayek, Individualism. See note 2,  infra. 
$"LLLMrefers to Hayek, Low, Legislution and Liberty. See note 4 ,  infro. 
Though in general Hayek's analysis of Adam Smith and Bentham may 
be sound, it is worth noting that it was the constructivist rationalist 
Bentham who chastised the critical rationalist Smith for failing to recognize 
just how far the invisible hand could reach. Bentham's "In Defense of 
Usury"" makes a consistent case against Smith's advocacy of government- 
imposed interest rate ceilings. It may be argued, however, that in the con- 
text of their life work, the positions of Smith and Bentham on usury are not 
of great import. 
Of rather more significance for evaluating Hayek's categories are Hegel 
and Marx, to whom we now turn. Friedrich Hegel and Karl Marx are iden- 
tified as constructivists. But they certainly did not believe that all human 
society was the result of conscious design. Indeed, one of the main features 
of their systems was the necessary historical evolution of human institu- 
tions. It is in this crucial respect that Giambattista Vico has been viewed by 
some as a precursor of Hegel and Marx. Thus Maximilien Rube1 claims that 
"it is in authors like Vico, Ferguson, and Mandeville that Marx seems to 
have found, in diverse and contradictory forms, the constituent elements of 
a Promethean vision of history."l8 If, as Hayek claims, Vico, Ferguson and 
Mandeville are critical rationalists, then it is inconsistent to identify Hegel 
and Marx as constructivist rationalists. But a consideration of these men 
reveals something more important than Hayek's inconsistency. What it 
reveals is that there is no inevitable connection between a belief in invisible- 
hand processes and a sympathy for the open society. Men from all points on 
the political spectrum have emphasized the explanatory importance of the 
undesigned, historical evolution of institutions. Normative approval of 
such a process does not imply approval of laissez faire. l9 
According to Hayek, Karl Popper is par excellence a critical rationalist. 
In fact, Popper does not share the pessimism toward the power of human 
reason which Hayek identifies as characteristic of critical rationalism. 
Recall the passage from Hayek on such pessimism and then reconsider the 
following passage on the same subject from Popper: 
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Man can know: thus he can be free. This is the formula which explains 
the link between epistemological optimism and the ideas of liberalism. 
This link is paralleled by the opposite link. Disbelief in the power of 
human reason, in man's power to discern truth, is almost invariably 
linked with distrust of man. Thus epistemological pessimism is linked, 
historically, with a doctrine of human depravity, and it tends to lead to 
the demand for the establishment of powerful traditions and the 
entrenchment of a powerful authority which would save man from his 
folly and his wickedness." 
Note that Popper and Hayek agree that there is a connection between poli- 
tics and pessimism toward reason. But while Hayek sees such pessimism 
leading to classical liberalism, Popper connects it with authoritarianism. 
This is not sufficient to label Popper a constructivist rationalist, since on the 
level of practical politics he does meet Hayek's definition for critical ration- 
alism (and perhaps also on the level of ethics). Instead, we claim that, as 
was true with Hegel and Marx, Popper fits neatly into neither of the cate- 
gories. Thus what is questioned is not Hayek's categorization so much as the 
categories themselves. 
So far, only individuals who have been explicitly classified by Hayek as 
either critical or constructivist rationalists have been discussed. But for 
Hayek's classification scheme the most embarrassing case is John Locke, a 
man who is never definitely labelled as either constructivist or critical.21 
Locke is almost universally recognized as one of the intellectual founding 
fathers of the open society,Zz yet he has one of the characteristics that 
Hayek identifies as clearly constructivist: his theory is one of social con- 
tract. So, like Hegel, Marx and Popper, Locke does not easily fit into either 
of Hayek's categories. This difficulty, of course, applies equally well to the 
social contract disciples of Locke, most notably Thomas Jefferson and 
Robert N0zick.~3 
When we add to the men discussed in the last few paragraphs all of those 
whom Hayek himself admits do not fall neatly into his categories (Spencer, 
Mill, Kant and Humboldt), then the obvious conclusion is that Hayek's 
categories are of little value because they wrongly presuppose that particu- 
lar positions in epistemology, ethics and politics coincide. In fairness, it 
should be noted that the fallacy of making too simple a connection between 
epistemology, ethics and politics is not unique to Hayek. According to Alan 
Gewirth a similar fallacy is committed by such notable figures as Bertrand 
Russell, John Dewey, Jacques Maritain and Reinhold N i e b ~ h r . ~ ~  
Hayek's Ethics 
In the preceding section it was shown that Hayek's categories of "con- 
structivist" and "critical" rationalism are of little use because they wrongly 
presuppose that there is a connection between beliefs on the different levels 
of discourse, when in fact no such logical or historical connection exists. In 
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this section attention will be focused on what Hayek has to say on just one 
of the levels-the ethical. Here we face an embarrassment of riches: Hayek 
adopts four distinct and mutually inconsistent positions in ethics, a t  least 
one of which he elsewhere condemns as constructivist. Since this is a strong 
and damaging claim, it will be documented by fairly extensive quotation 
from Hayek's works. The four ethical positions which Hayek endorses are 
those of relativism, Social Darwinism, utilitarianism, and social contract 
theory. 
Hayek the Relativist. Hayek's pessimism toward the powers of reason 
and his respect for the historical evolution of institutions have already been 
noted. One ethical position that would be compatible with these views 
would be to claim that one is absolutely certain, through religious revela- 
tion, intuition or  some other nonrational force, that one's own institutions 
are superior to all others. Alternatively, it would not be inconsistent with 
either Hayek's pessimism or  his respect for traditions, t o  argue that all in- 
stitutions can be evaluated only in relation to the values and other institu- 
tions of particular cultures. What follows is part of Hayek's endorsement of 
this sort of ethical relativism: 
When we say that all criticism of rules must be immanent criticism, we 
mean that the test by which we can judge the appropriateness of a par- 
ticular rule will always be some other rule which for the purpose in hand 
we regard as unquestioned. The great body of rules which in this sense is 
taciily accepted determines the aim which the rules being questioned 
must also support; and this aim, as we have seen, is not any particular 
event but the maintenance or restoration of an order of actions which 
the rules tend to bring about more or less successfully. The ultimate test 
is thus not consistency of the rules but compatibility of the actions of 
different persons which they permit or require. It may at first seem puz- 
zling that something that is the product of tradition should be capable 
of being both the object and the standard of criticism. But we do not 
maintain that all tradition as such is sacred and exempt from criticism, 
hut merely that the basts of crmclm of any one product of tradmon 
mu$[ aluays be other producrs oftrad~uon wh~ch we enher cannot or do 
not want to question;in other words, that particular aspects of culture 
can be critically examined only within the context of that culture. We 
can never reduce a system of rules or all values as a whole to a purposive 
construction, but must always stop with our criticism at something that 
has no better ground for existence than that it is the accepted basis of 
the particular tradition. Thus we can always examine a part of the whole 
only in terms of that whole which we cannot entirely reconstruct and the 
greater part of which we must accept unexamined. As it might also be 
expressed: we can always only tinker with parts of a given whole but 
never entirely redesign it." 
.............................................................. 

The much discussed question of "moral relativity" is thus clearly con- 
nected with the fact that all moral (and legal) rules serve an existing 
factual order which no individual has the power to change fundamen- 
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tally; because such change would require changes in the rules which 
other members of the society obey, in part unconsciously or out of sheer 
habit, and which, if a viable society of a different type were to be 
created, would have to be replaced by other rules which nobody has the 
power to make effective. There can, therefore, he no absolute system of 
morals independent of the kind of social order in which a person lives, 
and the obligation incumbent upon us, to follow certain rules derives 
from the benefits we owe to the order in which we live.26 
Few thinkers have been satisfied with a position of ethical relativism. Most 
want to be able to say that Idi Amin's bloodbath was wrong, not just rela- 
tive to the arbitrarily preferred values of Western culture, but absolutely. 
Hayek the Social Darwinist. Hayek's "Institutional Social Darwinism" 
may be compatible with his relativism if it is viewed as a purely descriptive 
(non-normative) doctrine. Hayek claims that: "The error of Social Dar- 
winism was that it concentrated on the selection of individuals rather than 
on that of institutions and practices, and on the selection of innate rather 
than on culturally transmitted capacities of the individual^."^' His own ver- 
sion of Social Darwinism is aptly summarized in the following paragraph: 
These rules of conduct have thus not developed as the recognized con- 
ditions for the achievement of a known purpose, but have evolved be- 
cause the groups who practised them were more successful and 
displaced others. They were rules which, given the kind of environment 
in which man lived, secured that a greater number of the groups or 
individuals would survive. The problem of conducting himself success- 
fully in a world only partially known to man was thus solved by ad- 
hering to rules which had served him well but which he did not and 
could not know to he true in the Cartesian sense.z8 
Hayek's relativism would perhaps be more palatable if it could be shown 
that the institutions of free, civilized societies have had greater survival 
value than those of unfree barbaric ones. The institutions of Athens were 
presumably freer than those of Sparta, yet Athens was defeated. Few would 
argue that the Huns conquered the Romans because their institutions were 
freer or more civilized. Consider a third example. The Mongols conquered 
China, but did not complete their conquest of the tribes of Northern 
Europe. If good institutions pay off in terms of survival, then the inference 
has to be that the institutions of the European tribes were superior to those 
of the Mongols which were in turn superior to those of the Chinese. The 
inference is implausible on its face. However, far more likely is the explana- 
tion that the Mongols defeated the Chinese because of superior military 
technique and gave up on the European tribes because the Europeans were 
such a sorry lot that they were not worth the effort. The superior institutions 
of the Chinese produced material goods that attracted the Mongol looters 
while the inferior institutions of the European tribes created little beyond 
subsistence. So the superior culture of China was conquered, while the 
European tribes survived.t9 A single principle for the natural selection of 
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societies is hard to isolate, but the ability and will to  wield force seems at 
least as important as free rules of conduct. Societies with relatively free and 
just institutions may or may not be the ones with the ability and the will to 
defend themselves. 
It is open to question whether Hayek's doctrine of Institutional Social 
Darwinism is rightly classed as a doctrine of ethics at all. For Hayek ex- 
plicitly says that "the frequent attempts made to use the conception of 
evolution, not merely as an explanation of the rise of rules of conduct, but 
as the basis of a prescriptive science of ethics, also have no foundation in 
the legitimate theory of evolution, but belong to those extrapolations of 
observed tendencies as 'laws of evolution' for which there is no 
justification."'0 But Hayek himself slides into a normative interpretation of 
his Institutional Social Darwinism. According to Hayek, evolution will 
result in the spontaneous order of which he approves: "rules of just con- 
duct, like the order of actions they make possible, will in the first instance be 
the product of spontaneous growth."" 
If institutional natural selection screens societies largely on the basis of 
their willingness and ability to wield force, then the existence of free so- 
cieties cannot be explained on the basis of natural selection. Neither, if bar- 
baric societies continue to survive, can free societies be justifredon the basis 
of natural selection. 
Hayek the Utilitarian. Hayek occasionally endorses a third sort of 
ethical position, utilitarianism. Here rules and institutions are not judged 
relative to cultures nor checked for their survival value, but rather evaluated 
for the good that they do  for the members of the society. Hayek's most ex- 
plicit endorsement of this sort of utilitarianism was made in the following 
passage: 
Utilitarianism appears in its first and legitimate form in the work of 
the same David Hume who was so emphatic that "reason itself is utterly 
impotent" to create moral rules, but who at the same time insisted that 
the obedience to moral and legal rules which nobody had invented or de- 
signed for that purpose was essential for the successful pursuit of men's 
aims in society. He showed that certair abstract rules of conduct came 
to prevail because those groups who adopted them became as a result 
more effective in maintaining themselves. What he stressed in this 
respect was above all the superiority of an order which will result when 
each member obeys the same abstract rules, even without understanding 
their significance, compared with a condition in which each individual 
action was decided on the grounds of expediency, i.e., by explicitly con- 
sidering all the concrete consequences of a particular action. Hune is 
not concerned with any recognizable utility of the particular action, but 
only with the utility of a universal application of certain abstract rules 
including those particular instances in which the immediate known 
results of obeying the rules are not desirable. His reason for this is that 
human intelligence is quite insufficient to comprehend all the details of 
the complex human society, and it is this inadequacy of our reason to 
362 THE JOURNAL OF LIBERTARIAN STUDIES Fall 
arrange such an order in detail which forces us to be content with ab- 
stract rules; and further that no single human intelligence is capable of 
inventing the most appropriate abstract rules because those rules which 
have evolved in the process of growth of society embody the experience 
of many more trials and errors than any individual mind could 
acq~ire. '~ 
What might be called "moderate utilitarianism" also is endorsed in what re- 
mains Hayek's best work in political philosophy, The constitution of 
Liberty: 
It is true enough that the justification of any particular rule of law must 
be its usefulness-even though this usefulness may not be demonstrable 
by rational argument hut known only because the n~ l e  has in practice 
proved itself more convenient than any other. But, generally speaking, 
only the rule as a whole must be so justified, not its every application.j4 
Hayek's "moderate utilitarianism" appears closely akin to rule utilitarian- 
ism, so it is relevant t o  record his recent comments on this brand of the posi- 
tion: 
No system of generic or rule utilitarianism could treat all rules as fully 
determined by utilities known to the acting person, because the effects of 
any rule will depend not only on its being always observed but also on 
the other rules observed by the acting persons and on the rules being 
followed by all the other members of the society. To judge the utility of 
any one rule would therefore always presuppose that some other rules 
were taken as given and generally observed and not determined by any 
known utility, so that among the determinants of the utility of any one 
rule there would always he other rules which could not be iustified by 
their utility. ~ule-utilkarianism consistently pursued could therefore 
never give an adequate justification of the whole system of rules and 
must always include determinants other than the known utility of par- 
ticular rules.3* 
Thus Hayek appears to have shifted from approval of moderate utilitarian- 
ism to  condemnation of all utilitarianism. 
Hayek the Contractarian. When Hayek condemns utilitarianism as  con- 
structivist it is not altogether clear whether this condemnation applies t o  all 
utilitarianism or  just to that of the Benthamite-act variety. At least when 
judged on  the criterion of optimism about the powers of reason, even 
Hayek's moderate utilitarianism is more constructivist than his relativism or  
his Social Darwinism. But whatever we conclude about his utilitarianism, 
the final position that Hayek endorses is clearly of the sort that he elsewhere 
condemns as constructivist. The position that Hayek endorses in the second 
volume of Law, Legislation and Liberty is the Rawlsian version of social 
contract theory. In his preface Hayek claims that the differences between 
him and Rawls are "more verbal than s~bstantive.")~ The extent of Hayek's 
1980 HAYEK ON CONSTRUCTIVISM AND ETHICS 363 
endorsement of Rawls may perhaps best be illustrated by the following line 
near the end of Hayek's second volume: 
The conclusion to which our considerations lead is thus that we should 
regard as the most desirable order of society one which we would choose 
if we knew that our initial position in it would be decided purely by 
chance (such as the fact of our being horn into a particular family).'' 
As anyone familiar with A Theory of Justice will recognize this is vintage 
Rawls in a cask marked "Hayek"; but recall what it is that Hayek is en- 
dorsing here. Rawls explicitly states that: 
My aim is to present a conception of justice which generalizes and car- 
ries to a higher level of abstraction the familiar theory of the social con- 
tract as found, say, in Locke, Rousseau, and ~ a n 1 . i ~  
As noted in an earlier section of this paper, Hayek condemns as construc- 
tivist the 
intentionalist or pragmatic account of history lwhichl found its fullest 
expression in theco&eption of the formationof socieiy by a social con- 
tract, first in Hobhes and then in Rousseau, who in many respects was a 
. . 
direct follower of Descartes. Even though their theory was not always 
meant as a historical account of what actually happened, it was always 
meant to provide a guideline for deciding whether or not existing insti- 
tutions were to be approved of as rational.39 
If Hayek has shifted his position from the first volume to the second of what 
was meant to be a unified work, then surely he owes us a few lines ex- 
plaining why. As it is, we are left with a major, unresolved inconsistency. 
Conclusion 
Even in his early writings, Hayek emphasized the limitations of the individ- 
ual human mind. His argument in "The Use of Knowledge in Society" was 
that no individual (or planning committee) could possibly comprehend the 
vast array of information about production possibilities (supply) and con- 
sumer valuations of products (demand) that is automatically summarized in 
market prices. The essay claims that the free market is the most efficient 
system for producing what people want at minimum cost but makes no  
claims that the free market is thereby morally preferred. 
Hayek's problems arise when he goes beyond claims that can be eval- 
uated within economic science. The human mind, Hayek says, is not just 
limited in its ability to syn:hesize a vast array of concrete facts, it is also 
limited in its ability to give a deductively sound ground to ethics. Yet here is 
where the tension develops, for he also wants to give a reasoned moral 
defense of the free market. He  is an intellectual skeptic who wants to give 
political philosophy a secure intellectual foundation. It  is thus not too sur- 
prising that what results is confused and contradictory. 
364 
I 
THE JOURNAL OF LIBERTARIAN STUDIES Fall 
NOTES 
I am grateful to Alan Gewirth and Burt Louden for useful comments. Some of the same points 
made here are discussed in an independently written paper by John N. Gray entitled "F. A. 
Hayek on Law, Liberty and Justicein a Liberal Society," (first draft, August 1979); revised and 
published under the title "F. A. Hayek an Liberty and Tradition," Journal ofLibe~arion 
Sludies4, no. 2 (Spring 1980): 119-37. Also relevant are the papers by Eugene F. Miller and 
Tibor Machan in Robert L. Cunningham, ed., Liberty and the Rule ofLaw (College Station, 
Texas: Texas A & M Universitv Press. 1979). The final draft of this oaoer was written while I . . 
uar a member oi  a Reawn ~ o h d a t i o n  s rnkar  %upported b) the Ljbcrlv Fund. 
Fricdrlrich A Hayck, The Xuod to Scrfdonz (1944; rcprmt rd.. C 'h~~agd:  The Uni \ r rsq  of 
Chicago Press, 1969). 
2. Hayek, "The Use of Knowledge in Society" reprinted in Hayek, individualism and 
Economic Order (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1972). pp. 77-91. The article first 
aooeared in the American Economic Review 35. no. 4 (Sentember 1945): 519-30. 
3. d&e Soule, review of Hayek's Individualism i n d  ~ c&dm i c  Order, Nblion. September 
2 5  194R~ 
-., 
4. Hayek, Law, Legislation andLikrty,  3 vals. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1973-79), 1: 10. 
5. Law, Legislotion ondLiberty. The first volume was published in 1973 and the second in 
1976. The third and final volume was published in 1979. 
6. Hayek, "Individualism: True and False," reprinted in Individuolism ondEconomic Order, 
pp. 1-32. 
7. Hayek. "Kinds of Rationalism." reprinted in Hayek. Sludies in Philosophy, Politics and 
Economics (New York: Simon and Schuster, 19671, chap. 5. 
8. Hayek, "The Errors of Constructivism," translated from the original German and re- 
printed in Hayek, New Studies in Philosophy, Polilicr, Economics and the Hislory of 
Ideas (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1978), chap. 1. 
9. Hayek, "The Results of Human Action But Not of Human Design," reprinted in Srudiesin 
Philosophy, chap. 6. 
10. Hayek, "The Legal and Political Philosophy of David Hume," reprinted in Studies in 
Philosophy, chap. 7. 
11. Hayek, Srudies in Philosophy, pp. 92-93. 
12. Hayek, Individuolism, p. 8. 
13. Hayek, Studies in Philosophy, p. 85. 
14. Hayek, Low, Legislation and Liberly, 1: 10. 
15. rhid~.21 17-18.
- ..., -. ~ 
16. Hayek, Studies in Philosophy, p. 85. 
17. Jeremy Bentham, "In Defense of Usury," in W. Stark, ed., Jeremy Benrham'sEconomic 
Wrirings (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1952), 1: 121-207. 
18. As auoted in Eunene Kamenka. "Vico and Marxism." in Giorrio Tarliacouo. ed., 
~iambottista An Internorionol Symposium (Baltimore: The johns ~ o p k i n s  Press, 
1969). Kamenka doubts that Vico war a significant influence on Marx, but he does not 
question that their systems, though independently developed, shared an emphasis on the 
historical evolution of institutions. In a footnote Hayek himself admits that "the idea [of 
social theory as the study of theunwanted social repercussions of nearly all actions] was 
clearly expressed by Adam Ferguson and Adam Smith, to mention only the authors to 
whom Marx was unquestionably indebted," Sludies in Philosophy, p. 100. 
19. Nor does normative disapproval of such a process imply disapproval of laisse,- faire. 
Joseph Schumpeter thought that there is an evolutionary process at work destroying 
capitalism. But he saw capitalism as a creative, liberating force, so he regretted the process 
of its destruction. See Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism undDemocracy, 3rd 
ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1962). pp. 61-163. 
20. Karl R. Popper, "On the Sources of Knowledge and Ignorance," in ConjecturesandRefu- 
lotions: The Growth of Scienlifrc Knowledge (New York: Harper & Row, 1965). p. 6. 
21. Hayek often quotes approvingly Locke's discussion of one sense of the term "reason."See 
New Studies in rheHistory of Ideas, p. 19; and Studies in Philosophy, pp. 84, 98, 107. But 
1980 HAYEK ON CONSTRUCTIVISM AND ETHICS 365 
Hayek also says that "even Locke could not entirely escape [constructivist rationalism's] 
influence," Studies in Philosophy, p. 107. 
22. Cf.. ex., Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the Americon Revolution 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1967); and Robert Nozick. Anarchy, Slate. 
and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974). 
23. Hayek wrote the preface to the first German edition of Nozick's Anarchy, Stare, ond 
utopia. 
24. Alan Gewirth, "Philosophy and Political Thought in the Fourteenth Century," in Francis 
Lee Utley, ed., The Forword Movement of rhe Fourreenlh Century (Columbus, Ohio: 
Ohio State University Press, 1961). Gewirth's essay is a masterful exposure of the fallacy. 
usine as illustration intellectual fieures from the Renaissance. 
25. ~ a & k ,  Law, Legidation and ~iber ty ,  2: 25. 
26. Ibid., 2: 26-27. 
21. Ibid., 1: 23. 
28. Ibid.. 1: 18. 
29. The Mongol counter-example was suggested to me by John Berthrong. 
30. Hay&, Law, Legislafion and Liberty, 1: 24. 
?I. Ihid 1 . t M.. . ...-.,.. ... 
32. Hayek, Studies in Philosophy, p. 88. 
33. Hayek. The Constiturion of Liberty (Chicago: Henry Regnery Ca., 1972). Hayek seems to 
recognize that in many ways the Consrirurion of Liberty is superior to his final trilogy. See 
his comments in the preface to the third volume of Law, Legislorion and Liberry, pp. 
xii-xiii. 
34. Hayek, Consrirurion ofLiberfy, p. 159. 
35. Hayek, Low, Legislorion and Liberty, 2: 20. 
16 lhid. 2: xiii... .. -. . ~ ~ ~ ~ .  
37. Ibid.. 2: 132. 
38. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971). 
39. Hayek, Law, Legislalion ond Liberty, 1: 10. 
